EXTERNALITIES ARE NOT ILLUSORY by Stein, Gregory M.
 
287 
EXTERNALITIES ARE NOT ILLUSORY 
Gregory M. Stein*
Professor Stefan Padfield’s article, “Totalitarian Nudges, Illusory 
Externalities, and Utopian Benefits: Reflections on the 34th Economics 
Institute for Law Professors,”1 is both interesting and thought-provoking. 
The article carefully describes several of  the topics addressed at the 34th 
Economics Institute for Law Professors, in which he participated. This 
response will address one of  the subjects Professor Padfield discusses, 
namely the question of  whether externalities are illusory. 
Externalities are the outside effects of  an activity that others are forced 
to bear, often unwillingly. A good example might be pollution: A 
manufacturing company must pay for its land, its building, its raw 
materials, its workers, its electricity, and its water, but it may not have to 
pay for the costs of  the pollution it emits. That is an external cost borne 
by others, such as neighbors who are breathing more polluted air or 
drinking tainted water. In effect, the polluter is taking someone else’s 
property – here, an easement – without permission or payment. 
If  an economic actor does not have to pay for the full costs of  its 
externalities, then it will engage in more of  that activity, which the 
polluter’s neighbors are unwillingly subsidizing. If  the water were free, the 
manufacturer would gravitate to a production process that uses more 
water and conserves other, more costly resources. Here, instead, it will 
pollute more because there is no financial downside. Moreover, it will likely 
produce more of  the good than its true cost warrants, since it is producing 
the good for less than its true cost. If  the manufacturer had to pay for 
smokestack scrubbers or a pollution easement over its neighbor’s property, 
the price of  the product would increase and demand would decrease 
correspondingly. So the manufacturer overuses the free resource and 
overproduces the product, consumers purchase more of  this unwillingly 
subsidized good, and the neighbors suffer by enduring pollution without 
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receiving compensation for their forced relinquishment of  a pollution 
easement.  
Economists argue that those who create externalities should be forced 
to internalize those costs. Once the formerly free input is priced 
appropriately, economic actors will no longer have unwarranted incentives 
to create external effects, because they now must pay for them. This is 
similar to the way the emitter would act if  it actually owned the 
neighboring land, since it would now bear the cost of  its own pollution. 
In fact, the ancient doctrine of  waste seeks to treat the owner of  just part 
of  a larger parcel as though it were the sole owner of  the entire parcel, in 
an effort to simulate how that owner would behave if  it truly were the only 
owner.2 If  the product is still cost-effective even after forcing the 
manufacturer to pay for its negative external effects, the manufacturer will 
continue to produce the product at its now higher cost. If  the product is 
no longer cost-effective, the manufacturer will recognize that production 
is not cost-efficient and will cease manufacturing it.3  
There are several ways in which a government body – most likely the 
federal government in air pollution cases – can facilitate the internalizing 
of  externalities. The government might prohibit the pollution altogether. 
This would force the manufacturer either to develop a pollution-free 
production method, to find a way to capture or cleanse the pollution it 
emits, or to stop manufacturing. The benefit of  this approach is that it 
ends the externality, thereby eliminating a trespass or a nuisance while 
maintaining the cleanliness of  the air that the neighbors breathe. The 
drawback to an outright ban is that it might work too well, by preventing 
the manufacture of  a product that still could be produced efficiently. If  
the benefit of  the manufactured item exceeds the cost of  the pollution 
externality, the producer would be able to turn a profit even after paying 
the neighbors for the cost of  the externality. The producer profits at a 
 
2 “A life tenant will have an incentive to maximize not the value of  the property . . . 
but only the present value of  the earnings stream obtainable during his expected 
lifetime. . . . The law of  waste forbids this.” RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW § 3.11, at 92 (8th ed. 2011).  
3 Such a product never should have been manufactured. The only reason it was is 
that the manufacturer was able to offload some of  its manufacturing costs onto unwilling 
neighbors, thereby making production profitable to itself  and burdensome to its 
neighbors. 
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reduced level while the neighbor is made whole. But a pollution ban 
eliminates this type of  privately negotiated solution.4  
Thus, the government must weigh the costs of  an outright ban against 
the benefits. Prohibitions, as just noted, are economically inefficient in 
cases in which the economic benefit of  the product exceeds the pollution 
damage. A rational government might prohibit the production of  
explosives in a residential neighborhood but not the manufacture of  an 
essential antibiotic even if  that process creates extremely dangerous 
byproducts. A product more mundane than dynamite or Cipro may be a 
desirable product that should be economically viable because its overall 
value exceeds its overall costs. But under a total prohibition, the product 
is banned because the manufacturer imposes an unavoidable, and 
proscribed, external effect on its neighbors. The government has simply 
decided to prohibit such activity, just as it forbids certain criminal activities. 
A more flexible approach might be to tax the pollution. Now, instead 
of  an outright ban, the government imposes an additional cost on the 
polluter. The manufacturer can still pollute, but it must pay the 
government for the privilege. It now has one more cost of  doing business, 
just as it would if  forced to purchase an easement from the neighbors, and 
it can decide for itself  whether it is still worthwhile to proceed. This 
approach encourages manufacturers to engage in research and 
development and rewards cleaner companies. It also has the benefit of  
favoring the most efficient businesses – those that can produce the 
product with less of  the harmful side effect – since they will pay a lower 
tax and produce at a lower price.5  
Setting the level of  the tax can be a challenge, of  course: Ideally, it will 
reflect the actual cost of  the pollution to those who suffer from it. If  the 
good is economically warranted – that is, if  its overall benefit exceeds its 
true costs – an appropriate tax will replicate the impact of  a required 
 
4 An outright ban will prevent production if  it is technologically impossible to 
prevent or cleanse the pollution, or perhaps even if  it is just extremely costly. If  
production of  the good would still be efficient — if  the manufacturer could pay the 
neighbors and still turn a profit — the good most likely would be produced in the absence 
of  a prohibition. But the total ban precludes this alternative. All of  this discussion 
assumes that the manufacturer and its neighbors have full information, are rational 
enough to reach an agreement by which the neighbors would be willing to sell a pollution 
easement to the producer, and do not have to worry about holdouts. 
5 This assumes that the cost of  attaining efficiency is lower than the cost of  paying 
the tax. If  it is higher, the producer will continue polluting and will pay the tax. Such 
behavior may, in turn, induce the government to increase the tax.  
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purchase of  a pollution easement. And to be precise, such a levy is not a 
tax, but rather is a user fee. The government charges the polluter for its 
use of  public air that it never had a legal entitlement to pollute. Moreover, 
to be entirely fair to the victims of  this pollution, the government should 
use the tax proceeds to compensate these victims for the property rights 
they have been forced to relinquish. In this way, the neighbor that suffers 
the pollution should end up no worse off  economically, though it cannot 
prevent the pollution from occurring.6 The neighbor’s legal right to 
pollution-free air is legally protected, but by a liability rule rather than a 
property rule.7 
A third option is a cap-and-trade system. Under such a system, the 
government determines just how much pollution the environment can 
bear and then imposes a pollution quota that ensures that manufacturers 
do not collectively emit more than this maximum safe level. This approach 
is really just a softer version of  an outright ban, in that it imposes that ban 
once the total pollution output reaches the allowable maximum. If  the 
government wants to reduce or eliminate the amount of  pollution over 
time, it can gradually reduce the quota.  
The initial pollution allowances must be allocated to existing 
companies, perhaps on a basis that reflects previous levels of  production 
or pollution. In the alternative, these allowances can be auctioned on the 
open market, bringing revenue to the government. The “trade” portion of  
“cap-and-trade” allows polluters to buy and sell their quota. Companies 
that pollute less can recoup some of  the costs of  reducing their emissions 
by selling their unused quota, while less efficient manufacturers must incur 
the cost of  purchasing additional quota from their competitors. If  the 
government reduces the quota over time, the price of  the tradable 
pollution permits will inch up, thereby providing a continuing, and 
gradually escalating, incentive to polluters to find alternatives to 
purchasing more quota. As permits become more expensive, polluters will 
have greater reason to invest in pollution-control processes, which will 
become more and more cost-effective over time. 
A fourth variation – already noted in passing in connection with the 
discussion of  the first option, above – is to assign the property right 
directly to the party forced to endure the externality. This alternative forces 
 
6  See Gregory M. Stein, Reverse Exactions, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 31–45 (2017). 
7 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of  the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–10 (1972) 
(distinguishing between property rules and liability rules). 
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the polluter either to cease generating the externality or to buy the right to 
pollute from the holder of  the property right. The victim of  the pollution 
enjoys a property right, and courts will enforce this right with a property 
rule: Violators will be enjoined.8 Any polluter that wishes to continue will 
be forced to purchase a pollution easement from the victim of  the 
pollution, and that victim, rather than a jury, will set the price.9 In other 
words, the polluting activity is still banned, as in the first option above, but 
unlike in the first option, the parties are allowed to negotiate their way 
around this limitation. 
For some externalities, enforcement by injunction followed by 
negotiation among the parties is a practical alternative, especially in cases 
in which the number of  parties involved is small and they act reasonably 
and with full information. Conversely, in pollution cases, the large number 
of  potential plaintiffs might lead to collective action problems. If  only one 
of  the victims refuses to transfer its property right to the polluter, then 
the polluter cannot proceed even if  all the other neighbors agree to convey 
an easement. And where large groups of  neighbors are involved, as in the 
typical pollution case, holdouts are more likely. 
In these last settings, the activity must cease unless courts protect the 
property right with only a liability rule. Now the activity may continue, but 
only if  the polluter pays jury-established damages to the victim.10 Since a 
jury, rather than the victims of  the pollution, decides whether the polluter 
may proceed, the holdout problem disappears. The jury allows the polluter 
to proceed if  the polluter is willing to pay a price that the same jury 
establishes.  
There are other possible ways of  addressing the externality problem. 
A legislature or a court may step in and reallocate existing property rights. 
For example, either of  these authorities might redefine trespass or 
nuisance law to permit an increased level of  pollution, at the risk of  
 
8 “[I]f  we consider that ‘externalities’ are simply a manifestation of  a failure to 
assign property rights, then, when feasible and under certain conditions, assigning 
property rights would allow for efficient trading.” Padfield, supra note 1, at 269, 280 
(footnote omitted). 
9 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1092. 
10 For an illustration of  this approach adopted by the New York Court of  Appeals, 
see Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970) (“[T]o grant the 
injunction unless defendant pays plaintiffs such permanent damages as may be fixed 
by the court seems to do justice between the contending parties. All of  the attributions 
of  economic loss to the properties on which plaintiffs' complaints are based will have 
been redressed.”). 
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spawning regulatory takings claims.11 Or a court may replace an existing 
property rule with a liability rule.12 This last option means that a jury, rather 
than the polluter’s neighbors, decides whether the infringement may 
continue, and also establishes a price for the right to proceed. 
What all of  these possible solutions have in common is that they seek 
to internalize the externality that the manufacturer previously caused, or 
to prevent it from occurring in the first place. Instead of  being permitted 
to harm its neighbors without cost, the manufacturer is either barred from 
polluting or charged for the right to do so. To fully internalize these 
externalities, any financial benefit received from the polluter, such as fees 
for pollution permits, should either be used by the government to alleviate 
the damage the polluter caused or distributed to the neighbors who suffer, 
in lieu of  damages.13  
The proceeds might, for instance, be used to pay for medical bills, 
property damage, or depreciation in property value caused by the 
pollution. In this way, the polluter is forced to pay for the pollution, and 
the polluter’s victim receives compensation for its losses or those losses 
are mitigated. If  the victim’s property right is protected by a property rule, 
the victim has the ability to have the offending act enjoined, which forces 
the polluter to deal directly with its victim on the victim’s terms. If  the 
property right is protected only by a liability rule, the polluter may proceed 
by paying a cost set by a court.14 
The internalizing of  externalities illustrates a setting in which 
economic analysis provides useful techniques for solving important 
societal problems. Nearly everyone recognizes the hazards of  polluting the 
air, but we also know that the manufacture of  some desirable or essential 
products inevitably creates pollution. In seeking to balance the harms of  
this pollution against the benefits these manufactured products bring, 
 
11 See, e.g., Bormann v. Bd. of  Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 319–20 (Iowa 1998) 
(holding that “the state cannot regulate property so as to insulate the users from 
potential private nuisance claims without providing just compensation to persons 
injured by the nuisance.”). 
12 This is what the Boomer dissent argued that the court’s majority was doing. Boomer, 
257 N.E.2d at 875 (Jasen, J., dissenting) (“I do not subscribe to the newly enunciated 
doctrine of  assessment of  permanent damages, in lieu of  an injunction, where substantial 
property rights have been impaired by the creation of  a nuisance.”). 
13 See Stein, supra note 6, at 31–45. The neighbors might also be able to bring a tort 
claim for personal injury or nuisance. Such claims are often costly to bring, difficult to 
prove, and uncertain in outcome as to both liability and remedy. 
14 Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 873; see also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1092. 
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legislatures and administrative agencies can make good use of  economic 
principles to achieve creative solutions. There will be legitimate political 
disagreements over what level of  pollution is wise, how much 
manufacturing is desirable, and how to price pollution permits properly. 
But the basic concept – that the polluter should pay for the air it is sullying 
and that the victim of  this pollution should receive some type of  
compensation for the harm it is forced to bear – seems hard to dispute 
and accords with centuries of  property law.  
This discussion illustrates one of  the strengths of  the law and 
economics movement. It demonstrates how in areas such as property law 
and tort law, which exhibit inherently economic features to begin with, the 
recent upsurge in economic analysis is not a huge departure from past 
judicial approaches. Property law developed as it did to protect 
entitlements, encourage investment, and safeguard personhood, and it 
established common-sense baseline default rules as a starting point for 
subsequent negotiations. Economic analysis is descriptive to the extent it 
accurately predicts and reflects common law rules that judges developed 
long ago, and it is normative when it argues in favor of  internalizing 
externalities as a means of  protecting existing property rights going 
forward. 
Thus, in subject areas such as property law, economic analysis is more 
useful, and perhaps less controversial, than it is in other areas, such as anti-
discrimination law or the law of  adoption. Even those who oppose the 
economic approach to legal analysis may grudgingly put up with its use in 
subjects such as property law, in which economic principles already play 
such a large role. It is somewhat surprising, then, that advocates for the 
use of  economic analysis in law would criticize efforts to internalize 
externalities. 
Professor Padfield argues in his article – or perhaps he summarizes 
Professor Terry Anderson, who presented at the Institute, as arguing – 
that externalities are illusory, because the initial entitlement can be assigned 
to either party. Rather than assuming the neighbors have a tort or property 
right to be free of  pollution, we could just as easily assume that the polluter 
has a tort or property right to pollute at its neighbors’ expense.15 
We could assume this alternative assignment of  property rights. But 
such an assumption usually is not justified, because property law is old 
enough that it has already allocated most of  the rights with which we are 
 
15 Padfield, supra note 1, at 279–82. 
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concerned, even if  they sometimes arise in new contexts.16 For instance, 
judges have long ruled in favor of  neighbors of  polluters on tort or 
property law grounds, holding the pollution to be a trespass or a 
nuisance.17 In property law terms, the neighbor already enjoys a property 
or tort law entitlement to be free from the off-site effects of  the polluter’s 
activities. We need not worry about whether the property right 
hypothetically might have been assigned to one party or the other, because 
the law has long ago decided who holds it.18  
The argument that externalities are illusory would be stronger if  the 
entitlement had not already been assigned to one party or the other. As a 
land use teacher, I regularly return to the common example of  a dentist’s 
office located adjacent to a dance studio. Does the dance studio enjoy an 
unfettered right to cause vibrations, or does the dentist enjoy a right to a 
vibration-free office? Either answer is reasonable. But once that property 
right has been assigned, as so many property rights already have, to argue 
that it could have been assigned differently is meaningless, and also makes 
the law and economics movement tautologically impossible to disprove.  
We could just as easily say that failure to pay for the I-beams necessary 
to construct a factory is not conversion or theft because the law could 
have assigned the right to seize them without payment to the factory 
owner. Or we could just as easily say that a factory building that encroaches 
 
16 For example, even though the common law may have established when a property 
owner has the right to be free of  the shade from a neighbor’s trees, only a modern court 
could re-examine this issue in the context of  trees that block the first owner’s passive 
solar collectors. See, e.g., Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 189–90 (Wis. 1982). 
17 See, e.g., Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378, 1382 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982) 
(“Sounds which are natural to this area — the sea, the shore birds, the ocean breeze — are 
soothing and welcome. The noise of  the [neighbor’s] windmill, which would be unwelcome 
in most neighborhoods, is particularly alien here.”); Bie v. Ingersoll, 135 N.W.2d 250, 253 
(Wis. 1965) (“The trial court abated the plant operation only to the extent that it 
constituted a nuisance. If  the asphalt plant can be operated in a way that odors and dust 
are not present to such a degree as to constitute a nuisance, then the order does not 
prohibit the operation of  the plant.”). 
18 Professor Padfield quotes Professor Anderson in referring to this as a “missing 
market because property rights are not defined.” Padfield, supra note 1, at 281 (quoting 
TERRY L. ANDERSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS: A PROPERTY 
RIGHTS APPROACH 56 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014)). But such property rights usually 
are defined, and have been so established for a prolonged period. When these rights have 
not been defined, then the occurrence of  new disputes suggests that they need to be and 
soon will be. Once these rights are settled, then either this assignment has created an 
externality or it has not, and the parties can bargain from there. 
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on a neighbor’s lot can remain there, because the law might have assigned 
property rights to the first party to improve land rather than to the record 
titleholder. The law certainly could have done these things. But it did not. 
And once these property rights are assigned, those who encroach on them 
can be enjoined or forced to pay damages. That is one of  the primary 
reasons we have property laws in the first place. 
In short, we might, following Coase, establish a property rule that 
allows trains to emit sparks even though those sparks cause fires that 
destroy the crops of  the farmer whose land abuts the tracks. Or we can 
assign to farmers a property right to be free from fires caused by the sparks 
trains generate as they pass alongside farms.19 It is largely immaterial which 
rule we select, as long as we select one and stick to it. This predictability 
allows railroads and farmers to invest in their respective businesses and 
negotiate accordingly. We need railroads, we need farms, they create 
incompatible adjacencies, and we must adopt rules to regulate the 
inevitable conflicts.  
Cases such as these demonstrate why property law, over time, has been 
forced to make many difficult choices. And once it does so, those who 
violate these rules are causing negative external effects that the law must 
find ways to abate or internalize. The law has established a rule (even 
though it might have adopted a different one), parties then act in reliance 
on that rule, and violators must either cease violating or pay compensation 
to those they have harmed. Assigning property rights is particularly 
important in cases involving widespread environmental harms, for those 
are the cases in which collective action problems make it unlikely that a 
market transaction will modify the initial assignment of  rights. 
Those who support economic analysis should be thankful that the law 
allows polluters to internalize the damage they cause, because permitting 
polluters the option to internalize is a superior option to an outright 
prohibition of  the pollution. Offering an internalization option allows the 
emitter to choose. It can continue to pollute, if  it is cost-effective to pay 
the price to internalize the externality and make the neighbor whole.20 Or 
it can cease operating if  the internalization price is too high, thereby 
 
19 R.H. Coase, The Problem of  Social Cost, 3 J. L. ECON. 1, 30–34 (1960) (discussing 
this issue using a farm analogy). 
20 One could argue that the neighbor should be made more than whole. All of  the 
voluntary participants in this transaction are better off. The polluter presumably would 
not proceed if  this were not the case, and the workers and suppliers the polluter retained 
are presumably turning a profit. See Stein, supra note 6, at 62–63. 
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making the externality disappear altogether. If  the overall benefits of  the 
polluting activity exceed the now-internalized costs, we have reached a 
utilitarian outcome that is both efficient and fair, and if  they do not, an 
inefficient activity will have been avoided. If  courts allow emitters to 
internalize, that leaves the decision with the polluter, which is certainly 
better than a court or legislature simply telling the polluter to cease 
operations. Once we have established a property rule, that rule necessarily 
tells us what property rights are, which uses are permitted as of  right, and 
which uses cause externalities. The law of  property is well established and 
has already allocated these rights, which means that externalities are not 
illusory. 
Professor Padfield concludes by stating, “The theme I have focused 
on here is one of  questioning widely held assumptions generally 
understood to support government intervention in markets. . . . While not 
decisive, the points raised in this Essay have the potential to add useful 
perspectives to the on-going debate about government regulation of  
markets.”21 I agree that it is valuable to question widely held assumptions, 
and I do not doubt that the Institute lessons Professor Padfield describes 
caused Institute participants to do just that. The examples he provides, 
however, seem to imply a concern that government interventions run the 
risk of  being political, and that non-intervention is a more neutral 
approach. It is useful to remember, however, that non-intervention 
inspired by economic thought is also a choice, and very much a political 
choice. The Institute arguments that Professor Padfield describes might 
be more persuasive if  they acknowledged that they, too, are political. 
Those who support these arguments could then argue that their political 
position is superior to the opposing political view, allowing listeners and 
readers to weigh both sides of  this argument and decide for themselves.  
 
21 Padfield, supra note 1, at 286. 
